1.
A PUZZLE AND ITS POSSIBLE RESOLUTION Amartya Sen's work in welfare theory and the conceptualization of human development is remarkable for having combined critique of a major area of mainstream economics-welfare economics-with several further steps: elaboration and communication of the Capability Approach (CA), a humanist alternative theory \vhich has been \Videly accessible and adopted, led to much empirical work and had significant policy impact.
2 It has been central to the Human Development Reports series (HDRs) launched for UNDP by Sen's close associate the late Mahbub ul Haq, and has subsequently influenced policy changes in the World Bank in the Wolfensohn era.
A puzzle arises. The capability approach has been fruitful and the HDRs are in many respects an important advance on earlier mainstream treatments of development.
Y et viewed from outside economics CA seems primitive in some ways, insufficient as a theory of \vell-being, and hardly a theory of the 'human' in human development (HD).
Amongst possible weaknesses are: its extreme emphasis on choice; obscurities in key concepts; and its emergence from a dialogue between economics and philosophy without much involvement from psychology, sociology and anthropology.
Human life is too complex to capture by a slogan that development is 'a process of enlarging human choices' (HDR 1990, p. 1 O, and several later HDRs) . With the elaboration of the HD concept, more indicators have been added to reflect other dimensions, straining or going beyond CA's language. This limitation concerns the ambition of the claims sometimes made in CA, and can be remedied by reducing their strength.
More fundamental are possible \Veaknesses in the clarity, coherence or realism of CA's other components. (Where necessary we will distinguish Sen's version by the acronym SCA.) The Capability-Functionings (C-F) conceptualization serves well to critique conventional welfare economics or the focus on GNP, but appears an insufficient basis for a whole theory of human development. Examination of the centrai concepts in SCA-functionings, capabilities and (positive) freedom, agency, and well-being-reveals some obscurities and question marks, as we will see in Sections 4 through 6.
General concepts cannot be perfect but there is scope here for clarification and refinement.
More fundamental still, and germane to the needed refinement, relatively little theory of being, of being human, seems to underlie SCA's proffered perspective on 2 See Pressman & Summerfield (2000) fora useful overview and an invaluable bibliography.
1rel!-being; except fora discourse of freedom, seen primarily as choice. The connection to other strands in social science is still limited, though increasing ( e.g. Sen, 2000a) .
Even the fine volume on The Quality of Life from the UN's WIDER institute (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993) represents very largely a conversation amongst economists and Anglo-American philosophers. This gap may mirror the insouciance of welfare economics, out of which SCA originally grew. Are psychologists, anthropologists and other disciplines still largely absent while economists build square wheels? Did SCA's very success in being adopted by UNDP help to freeze it prematurely?
I will suggest that we respond to the puzzle of CA's considerable influence yet paiily problematic components by being more precise on what CA is useful for and for whom, and on where it does not suffice. As prelude, Section 2 specifies the contents and nature of Sen's CA project, as major intellectual basis for the UN HDRs. Section 3 then looks at the role of the HDR work in focusing and broadening attenti on to the purposes of development and dethroning economie growth as centrepiece. (It does not try to cover Sen's or the HDRs' policy model for human development, and for example issues of the long-run relations between macro-economie liberalism and humanized public action.) It notes the furore around the Human Development Indices, which reflected the vested intellectual interests which Sen has helped to destabilize. CA provides an advance over mainstream economie welfare criteria (MEWC) and the overvaluation of GDP. 3 To be operational, simplified versions are needed, notably the indices, and CA's simplified versions surpass MEWC (viz. GNP, GDP, etc.) . However, SCA's role is to displace MEWC, not to be a new supposedly sufficient, all-purpose conception. For it does not suffice as a theory of well-being or a conceptualization of human development. When we assess it for those purposes, we ask for more than when within the bounds and conventions of welfare economi es.
A deeper criticism then than the limits of the HD indices has been the claim that the Human Development work is not adequately human. Sections 4, 5 and 6 consider 3 As Lipsey (2001) observes, mainstream economie discussion is in practice utilitarian more than Paretian. Interpersonal comparisons are made openly or implicitly, typically using people's purchasingpowers as weights, via adoption ofthe principle ofpotential compensation, as for example in cost-benefit ana!ysis: if gainers could compensate Iosers then a change is judged an improvement, regardless of whether compensation is actually made. Hence GDP dominates. Compensation and distribution are deemed politica! issues, beyond economics; if compensation is not made then it is assumed to have been politically judged as unjustified, e.g. on grounds that the rules of the game are utilitarian. This calculus informs economie policy and planning more than does Paretian welfare theory on the supposed impossibility of interpersonal comparisons etc.
possible problems in Sen's concepts: of capability and functioning; \Vell-being, agency and personhood; and freedom. His schema surpasses mainstream economics' view of human personhood by adding independent weight to freedorn; and by downgrading the nomrntive weight of 'utility' interpreted as a feeling of happiness. It provides spaces for enriching economics, and has generated a valuable corresponding research programme.
But it is insufficiently refined to be the sole or predominant base for human development theory. Steps of great significance in the context of economics are less impressive in a wider context. Sen's approach remains with a thinnish conception of personhood, which can then contribute to: thin analyses of well-being; insufficient resistance to consumerism; still margina! assigned roles for sympathy and commitment to others; and a somewhat idealized conception of freedom. The criticisms apply especially to some of Sen's disciples, less sensitive to SCA's limits than is Sen hirnself.
The paper concludes with suggestions on where Sen's CA helps and where it is inadequate, and on additional and alternative bases for work on human development.
HD theory exceeds SCA, increasingly so. We must go beyond clarifying where SCA makes its contributions, to consider ho\V to enrich or surpass SCA to make an HD theory that is more widely adequate and can appeal to wider audiences. Ul Haq stressed (1998, pp. 228-9) that after a first phase in which the HD school met with irritated resistance and a second phase of uncritical acceptance, we require a third phase of critica! evaluation. The same applies for its CA partner.
THE CAPABILITY APPROACH
Sen's capability approach includes at least components 1 to 5 below, in decreasing order of centrality, and increasingly also number 6. Number 7 is penumbral, and numbers 8 and 9 lie outside his version.
• Component 1: A stance on information. There are many more types of information relevant in assessing welfare than the few-people's incomes, assets, and utility (levels of satisfaction or preference-fulfilment)-traditionally considered by mainstream economics. Centrally, \Ve should also look at how people actually live, and at the freedom they have to choose how they live. In contrast, through to the l 980s even the UN had defined development in terms of GDP per capita, plus from the l 980s also in terms of the capacity for its long term grovv1h (Simonis, 1992 ).
• Component 2: A specific set of categories, a language. Sen added severa! con-cepts-capabilities, functionings, agency, sympathy, commitment, quality of lifeto those conventional in micro-and welfare economics: incarne, goods, and utility.
One could list each of these concepts as a distinct component of SCA, but since they are a linked set, \Ve treat them here as such, as a language. Fzmctionings are various components or aspects of how a person lives. Together a set (vector, or ntuple) of functionings makes up a person's life. A person's capability (capability set) is the set of alternative functionings vectors she could attain, in other words the extent of her positive freedom. Figure 1 shows basic interrelations of these concepts. It is still a simplification; e.g., there can be feedbacks from functionings to skill-capabilities (Elson 1997 discusses work that disables).
Figure 2 highlights two parts of the conceptual system: the distinctions between potential and achievement, or capability and functioning; and between own wellbeing and the agent's fuller set of objectives. Sen argues that the fuller information \Ve require includes not only how much persona! well-being agents achieve but what they were free to achieve, and that we consider each of these cases both in terms of the agent's actual objectives and their persona! \Yell-being. Other factors than own WB -including WB of others, and agent's other purposes SCA is known for its focus on well-being freedom, which is its primary category of capability. But it is also concemed ('though not with equal reach' [Sen, 1993, p. 49]) with agency freedom, the agent's ability to impact on all her values, including those for other people and those which bring no personal well-being. Income is one measure of this agency freedom (AF), albeit very imperfect. is here seen as an appropriate measure of advantage rather than of well-being 4 In Figure 1 , agency in the ordinary sense is seen in the acquisition and use of income and goods, and the use of capabilities. In the sense of pursuit of an agent's objectives it is reflected both in the box 'Own \VB', insofar as own well-being falls within the objectives, and the box 'Other factors than own \VB', insofar as the agent has other objectives. (WBA), though it might contribute to \\'ell-being. In contrast, Functionings much more concern well-being. The very term 'functioning' matches 'being' better than does 'capability'. N ext come a seri es of competing-cum-complementary approaches to determining how and whìch capabilities should be prioritized.
• Component 5: A principle akin to consumer sovereignty, namely that priority capabilities are those which 'people have reason to value' (see e.g. HDR 1998, p.40).
Having distanced itself from felt utility and preference :fulfilment, SCA re-admits preferences here, but with a stress on inforn1ed and educated preferences about capabilities. Since it works at a policy level with a capability currency, how SCA operationalizes this idea is not obvious; hence the addition of component 6.
• He provides a system which has a careful philosophical basis, and that accomodates, justifies and link:s a wide range of concems, far wider than those subsumable under the economics category of real incarne (Sen, 2000b The content and assumptions of Sen's work reflect that he is engaged in a conversation with economists and analytic philosophers, as a member of both groups. He proceeds in ways which are accessible and credible to mainstream economists, his origina! and main reference group, and retains most of their assumptions and style; thus he omits for example much substantive discussion ofthe content of processes of choice.
This style can feel abstract and empty to many from other disciplines and professions. Its theory of well-being still rests on the basis of relatively little explicit consideration of being; nor, as a result, has it an explicit and elaborated theory of the good.
There is a contrast here in both respects with Nussbaum. Her CA is richer and even so is incomplete compared to material from psychology about what brings people satisfactions. The HDRs too have, as we will see, a fuller conception of being than do Sen's formal writings.
Sen's approach has wide appeal, however, since it seems a feasible way forward both to some mainstream economists and some critics. It offers a clear improvement, with more of a theory of being than in mainstream economi es but not so much as to en-danger the device of aggregate indices orto lose the economist audience. Further, while the formal core of his approach is conceived and expressed in the stripped-down abstract style, Sen uses richer cases for motivation, illustration, testing and application.
He talks about specific people, real or imagined: he adds the philosopher's imaginable case and the administrator's real case to the economist's individual depleted of all personality other than appetite, volition and powers of calculation (Gasper, 2000a; van Staveren, 2001 ).
Sen has consciously stayed apart from the more substantive formulations of human potentials, requirements and personality by basic human needs theorists and Nussbaum. Those perhaps cannot be formalized in the \Vays required by his style, but he also fears essentialism and cultural parochialism. However the possible price for distance from more substantive work on the meaning, contents and requirements of human-as opposed to human resource-<levelopment is a series of limitations, as claimed by various authors:
1. Sen's concepts of functioning, capability and capabilities are sometimes obscure.
2. His conceptions of well-being and agency are problematic and partake of some weaknesses of utilitarian psychology; \vhile his conception of personhood is very incomplete.
3. His conception of freedom seems too focused on range of (valued) choice, and neglectful of other aspects of being and need.
\Ve consider these criticisms in tum in sections 4 to 6. Before that, Section 3 presents the UN's Human Development approach which CA underpins and which has effectively challenged mainstream economie criteria, and looks at the objection that it is still not sufficiently human.
THE UNDP 'HUMAN DEVELOPMENT' SCHOOL -CONTENTS AND CRITICISMS

Emergence and ambitions of the UNDP HD work
The 1990s Human Development Reports have provided a channel for alternative development thinking, through the Uniteci Nations system but \Vith an autonomous voice. They have a global perspective not only a focus on 'the South', unlike in the World Bank's so-called World Development Reports. They have gone beyond the 1970s responses to the limits to trickledown from economie growth, by arguing that measures like directly investing to meet basic needs are not only growth-compatible but 9 can promote growth. Here they built on the perception of the centrality of 'human capita!' in growth and relateci lessons from the East Asian success stories. Building also from perceptions of low or declining quality of life in some rich or fast growing countries (ul Haq, 1998, Ch. 3), they redefined human development as improvement in human well-being, and thus as more than human resource de\·elopment, the building of human capitai to support economie growth. People are not just the principal means but, even more important, the principal ends of development (Anand & Sen, 2000) . Economie growth must be seen as a means towards human development rather than human development as being for economie growth.
The adjective 'human' in 'Human Development' thus conveys the suggestion that earlier economie development was not human-centred and that 'development' was in practice inadequately conceived and operationalized as economie growth. GNP was never suited to be a measure of well-being. It was designed to measure monetized activity, much of which represents lack of or loss of well-being; it excludes many other aspects of or influences on well-being (household work, family life, leisure, freedom, etc.; HDR 1996, pp. 56-7); and it can conceal extreme deprivation for large parts of the population.
Development should be reconceived as about decent human lives, not in tem1s of per capita GNP.
Secondarily, the HD label evokes the 'Development of Humans'-Human Resource Development (HRD) and its functionality for economie advance-in other words a concem for 'human capitai', but now seen in a broader way. When Dreze & Sen (1995) for example stress the significance of basic educati on for economie grovv1h in India, even though retums are sometimes long delayed and even if India has plenty of qualified people for most immediate functions, they show how basic education also affects fundamental areas in state-society relations-including the ability to discipline govemment and other power centres-and the status of women, and hence much else, such as fertility pattems.
At the same time, the HDRs bave not downplayed economie growth. Contrary to the impression given in for example Ravallion (1997) , they have taken East Asia as their main model, not Kerala or pre-1977 Sri Lanka. The 1996 HDR held that while economie grovvth is neither sufficient for HD improvement nor necessary for it (the 1980s and early 90s saw major HD improvements without fast or even any economie gro\\1h in many countries); yet sustained rapid HD both requires and is promoted by fast economie grow1h, amongst other requirements, and this combination is the ideal. To operationalize such a conception, UNDP essayed a series of measures to go beyond GDP per capita. It valuably presents many indicators rather than glorifying one (see e.g. UNDP HDRO, 1997) . The most prominent, the Human Development Index, (HDI) was primarily originated by Sen and is based on: 1. mean longevity, 2. mean schooling and literacy, and 3. GDP/capita adjusted to reflect purchasing power. It is meant as an indicator of people's opportunities fora good life. Each ofthe three components is meant to forma proxy measure fora range of areas of choice.
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While accepting that income is only a means, the HDI uses GDP/capita as proxy for most other capabilities beyond survival, education and \Vhat those directly reflect (Anand & Sen, 2000) . This is problematic. Another charge Ievelled at the HDI was of unnecessary and misleading aggregation. But aggregation is essential to produce league tables, and these are required to capture attention-by showing the marked divergence in many cases of HDI ranking from GDP/capita ranking-and to thus focus thought on the inadequacies of GNP or GDP as a welfare measure and policy target (Streeten, 1995; Sen, 1999a) . In all this the HDR work has succeeded and had a major influence in the enrichment of development policy debate and planning during the 1990s. The aggregation weights and value choices it uses are explicit and transparent (see the HDR technical appendices; and e.g. Anand & Sen, 2000) , \vhereas the price weights which are used in market measures and often to make valuations in public policy are too often read as somehow representing no value choices. The HDR work makes the valuation and prioritization more open, and makes it clear that indicators are only indicators. No one has proposed HDI as a sufficient indicator for policy, unlike sometimes in the case of GNP. HDI serves instead mainly to weaken the primacy given to GNP. The summary indexes are not the core of the HD approach, but a counter to GNP and its associated presumptions and blindnesses. In a two-tier approach they are the !esser part, compared to the wealth of information presented on varied aspects of human development (Anand & Sen, 2000) ; but they have stimulated work on better measures and disseminated HD concepts and criteria. Sen originally disagreed with Mahbub ul Haq's judgements on the strategy and tactics of producing inevitably simplified indexes. Now he warmly acknowledges ul Haq's wisdom here (Sen, 1999a (Sen, & 2000b 'Neill, 1996 'Neill, , 2000 . 'Capability' here generally has an everyday meaning: capacity, skill, ability, aptitude; we can call this S-capability (S for skill and substantive; Gasper, 1997) . It is the sense that O'Neill seems to rely on when she talks of 'capabilities for action', 'capaciti es to reason', 'capacities to comply', commercial, cognitive and social capacities, and so on.
Sen has taken a more abstract meaning of capability: the set of life-paths attainable for a given person. 9 We can call it 0-capability (O for options and opportunities;
'options' seems aptest, and suitably economie; the usage is also akin to 'military capability'). But Sen still trades on the-appealing, more human-connotations of Scapability, perhaps because he aims to also communicate to and influence wider audiences. He dropped the label 'capabilities approach' in favour of 'capability approach', but still writes of 'capabilities' in more everyday ways, and when referring to sub-sets or particular attainable functionings in the capability set, or to the options to attain them.
The word 'capability' comes in routine CA and HDR use to cover any specific thing a person can do, be or have, and thereby loses distinctiveness. • Similarly, the 2000 HDR defines the [0-]capability (set) of a person, and in the next sentence switches to 'capabilities' without further explanation, so one would presume these are just the plural, referring to many people (p.17); but the study subsequently uses 'capabilities' to referto diverse aspects of a given person's life. 
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The HDR's founder himself repeatedly implicitedly used the S-versus 0-capability distinction. He stressed 'The contrast bet\veen women's capabilities and opportunities' and looked forward to 'a fundamental change in the very model of development so that human capabilities are built up and human opportunities enlarged' (ul Haq, 1998, pp. 208, 212) .
In her capabilities (sic) theory, Martha Nussbaurn has a more explicit and rich picture of human beings, and treats S-capabilities and further aspects of human person-IO Elsewhere it seems to talk of S-capabilities: 'nutrition, education, health care and socialization help build the human capabilities on which a person's human development-and society's-will depend' (HDR 2000, p.76 Elson (1997:57) : 'human capabilities which are activities through which people can express themselves'. (b) Harriss-White (1995: 138) : 'because nutriti on is a means to a variety of ends -in Sen's words it is a capability'; although nutrition in the sense ofbeing well/better-nourished is a means to various ends it is neither an 0-capability set nor an S-capability.
ality ( e.g. Nussbaum, 2000) . But she also distinguishes 0-capabilities, \Vhich she calls 'extemal' capabilities; and notes too that S-capabilities are derived from 'basic' (or better, 'potential I P-') capabilities, through training and leaming.
12 This trio of concepts, while imperfect, is superior to using a single label for diverse notions.
Sen has not followed this lead and refined his tem1inology. To change terms whose pitfalls one is familiar with and master of may seem unnecessary and disruptive.
The 0-capability concept has the merit of taking into account constraints and opportunities in the environment as well as persona! powers. Further, the obscurities have not prevented valuable work with operational measures of capability (whether variants of O-or S-) in the past decade.
13 But the weakly refined terminology derives from an insufficiently refined picture of persons, and leads then not only to confused and confusing usages: it perpetuates the crude picture of persons. And it seems remediable.
The 'capability' concept rests on the concept of 'functioning'. That spans not just many spheres of life, it covers widely different types of aspect. 'Functioning' sounds like 'activity': doing, being, operating. But it also covers outcomes of the activity (including of non-conscious activities) and in fact a series of stages. 'Functionings'
can mean a) an achieved state (like being without malaria), b) a conscious action to achieve the state (taking a malaria pill), c) internal bodily processes/activities (conve1iing the pill to guard against malaria), and d) activities consequent to the achieved state (like living longer). 14 Further, the achieved state can include the state of having a capability! Even 'utility' can be deemed a valuable functioning, a point long adopted by Sen to allow mental states as a family of types of functioning. The functionings space also spans all time periods: so the language of functionings covers both 1. health now and 2. a long life. Extending Figure 1 , we can draw Figure 3 as one scenario, to hint at the forest of stages and types of 'functioning' and of moments of choice and use of 'capabilities'.
12 Nussbaum's own labels are unsatisfactory. For S-capability she uses 'internal capability', but potentials are also internal. 'Basic' is similarly imprecise and possibly misleading, for one should know basic to what. 13 See Dreze & Sen (1995) as an example, and Sen (1999b) and Robeyns (2000) for surveys. Adequacy will depend on the purpose; e.g. for Nussbaum's agenda of identifying basic constitutional principles the need for precise measurement might be less. 14 This ambiguity or plurali!)' is reflected in the label chosen, 'functioning'. In mathematics a function is a relationship between inputs/activities and outputs, a mapping; in administration a function is an activity or set of activities towards specified outputs; and in everyday language it is the purpose fulfilled, the olltputs achieved, while 'functioning' means activity orto adequately fulfil a role.
Given the ambiguity of both 'capability' and the term on which it relies, 'functioning', and the ample spread of the latter, the distinction between the two is sometimes lost. 15 'Functionings' also sounds less appealing, less morally nourishing, than 'capabilities', so some users drift towards the latter; or \Vhen in doubt, mention both. While Sen's C and F terms are vague, they point to useful contrasts: with incarne and utility, and between themselves. The C versus F contrast is vital in a liberal philosophy where people have rights to opportunities and to then make their own choices, mistaken or not, self-oriented or not. Cohen (1993) argued that coverage of a range of possible stages between goods/characteristics and utility-including opportunities, activities and various levels of outcomes-by just two terms fits this perspective.
Most of life is placed under two heads: attainable activities or states, and persona! 15 In addition when Sen (1999b:75) 
\Vell-being
'Well-being' might mean any evaluation of a person's situation, or, more fittingly, any such evaluation which is focused on the person's 'being'. Sen's version of CA has an intermediately complex concept of well-being: the fulfilment of whatever own-functionings 'people have reason to value', and especially the freedom to allow this.
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17 Thus Nussbaum (2000), Gore (1997) and others reject Sen's 'agency'-'\\'ell-being' categorization: they share the concern for agency, but feel his concept of 'well-being' retains too much utilitarian baggage. 18 See Sumner (1996) fora probing examination ofSen's formulation by a philosopher.
Some critics doubt whether SCA diverges enough from mainstream economics to distance itself from consumerism: the unending addictive quest for fulfilment--or at least novelty and distraction-through commodities (Cameron, 2000) . Which pleasures and values enrich and sustain one, and others? And which disable? Argyle (1987) found, for example, in Britain that fulfilling work and quality of family life \vere key determinants of felt well-being. Yet if say quality of family life is unrelated to per capita income or negatively related to it, at least in some cases or some stages or for some styles of income gro\vth, then focus on income as the measure of well-being can se- The concept of well-being remains underdeveloped here because the theory of personhood is underdeveloped too. And so there is no close attention to other mental states (unconscious as well as conscious) either. Sympathy and commitment are not examined deeply. While sympathy means to feel with or for another, Sen restricts the term's scope to exclude ('commitment') cases where one has a concern but is not directly (dis)comforted -as if such concems were not feelings too and there were only one cmTency of feelings (namely, utility).
5.2
Personhood -concepts of agency and be-ing Central to Sen's view is the choosing, reasoning individual, but with little further specified content of being human ( cf. Bauman, 1988) . Though he refers also to rule-led behaviour and the constraints set by socially constructed meaning systems, and to individuals within families, the dominant impression is of people as choosers, their formation only lightly treated, rather than as actors more broadly. Somewhat in contrast, the market mechanism receives the accolade of 'a basic arrangement through which people can interact with each other, and undertake mutually advantageous activities. Thus seen it is very hard to appreciate how any reasonable cri tic could be against the market mechanism in genera!' (Sen, 2000a, p. 33) . Y et while markets have massive virtues, the broad objections to them are no mystery. Membership in markets is defined by the amount of exchangeable resources or money one has or can access as credit; thus markets exclude. Further, commoditization dehumanizes in various ways; and it generates concentrations of wealth \Vhich may come to dominate all spheres of life.
Even if one keeps to an instrumental view of community, one might hold that the link betv.:een inclusion and well-being is so major and universal that community (and/or family) membership deserves separate mention as a dimension of human development, as granted now in the HDRs. A further ground could be if not mentioning a vital instrument brings danger of its neglect. Strictly speaking however, separate mention implies more than instrumental status: that community membership (or affiliation, in Nussbaum's more flexible and nuanced formulation) is a universal good in itself, not just a handy instrument for giving individuals more valued options. People are seen as requiring affiliation. Perhaps this good can be described as a valued option, but if people without affiliation are harmed to such an extent as to no longer meet a conception of decent humanity, then to call it an option becomes misleading. However Sen eschews explicit listing of features as core requirements, other than physical subsistence and, one may say, freedom.
The CA is ethically individualistic in the sense that it assesses states of affairs only with respect to properties of individuals, notes Gore ( 1997) . He advocates that sin ce the content, meaning, and value of many functionings of persons depends on the cultural context (systems of language, norms, institutions), those systems have intrinsic value and one should not take isolated aspects of persons as the only objects of value.
Since we should reject methodological individualism, so we should reject ethical individualism, runs the argument. Robeyns (2000) denies CA is methodologically or ontologically individualistic. But it is in any case not clear that rejection of methodological individualism obliges rejection of ethical individualism; or even that SCA is exclusively ethically individualistic. 21 Whether SCA is or is not, should or should not be, any of these things, the underlying concem that emerges as one ponders such issues is rather that it uses a thin picture of persons ( cf. Stevens, 1996) , and so gives a thin and often insufficient basis for a theory of well-being and human development. This is a separate issue too from the defence of reason, secularism and cross-cultural learning,
where Sen ( e.g. 1999c) performs doughty and insightful servi ce, showing that much of the vaunted 'discovery' of identity is through (fallible) reasoning. Nussbaum does similar service but from a more substantial basis.
Sen declines, for carefully considered reasons, to present or even discuss a list of central capabilities; but that would be one path to thinking further beyond choiceutility-freedom frameworks. Nussbaum, for example, through that exercise conveys and stimulates a richer picture of aspects of being human (for example in her attention now to religion), whether or not one agrees with her particular formulations and prioritizations. She takes us much further from the world of the economie man of no specified and varied emotions: no friendship, emnity, pride and anger, loves and fears.
Giri and van Staveren see in Sen's CA a one-sided focus on reason and a relative neglect of the emotions and empathy, the emotional experience and maturation, required for and norma! to human life. Reason by itself is not enough to sustain a reasonable society. That 'requires a far fuller appreciation and acceptance and invitation of the other into one's ovm' writes Giri (2000 Giri ( , p. 1014 , who argues that the still strong self-as-distinct-from-other contrast which Sen uses becomes limiting. Thus Sen's sympathy and commitment categories may as yet figure like optional extras in the schema, not as essential parts of a healthy human being; and so his discussi on of what can promote them comes rather in passing (Sen, l 999b ) . The idea that the self needs sympathy and commitment towards 'itself likewise remain peripheral (Sen, 1999c; Giri, 2000) . Giri and Carmen hold further that Sen's 0-capability approach has not attended to capability dynamics, the self-development potential of persons or the potential for mobilized, group leaming; and that it, so far at least, connects insufficiently to building capacity for personal and social action, change and transfonnation. Its conception of capability remains vacuous, a liberal shell rather than a liberationist map.
Sen argues that the incompleteness of his CA is in some respects a merit, leaving it not required to declare answers \vhere none are (yet) available, compatible with various schools of thought, and hospitable to public debate. However, while the absence of a theory of personhood and agency is a deficiency rather than a defect, compatibility with defective theories-such as Economie Man-would be no virtue; and we saw residues of that theory ensconced in the spaces left in SCA by lack of a more conscious and elaborate theory of the person.
Would SCA have to change much to become of greater interest in a conversation with non-economist social scientists? The various gaps and deficiencies in conceptualizing \vell-being and personhood might well be remediable to give something that remains recognizably a variant or descendant of CA. Some other authors on capabilities and human development-perhaps including sections of the HDRs fertilized by the richer Basic Human Needs tradition and the study of care-go further than Sen.
Irene van Staveren's The Values of Economics is an important example, which could be subtitled: 'Adding attention to care, will, emotion, deliberation, and interaction, to humanize economics and human development theory'. A significant emergent research programme exists in such areas, on the content of both agency and well-being, and their reflection in welfare evaluation and public policy deliberation.
FREEDOM
Sen's work seems to centre now on 'development as freedom'. His book ofthat name stresses the instrumental roles of both negative and positive freedom, while the Human Development Report 2000, for which he provided the conceptual framework, posits that 'Human freedom is the common purpose and common motivati on of human rights and human development' (p.2). Everyone is assumed to prioritize freedom, if they are rational.
Sen is explicit that values of justice and care can and should be part of persons' agency objectives and commitments, and that CA does not provide or substitute for a fuller theory of justice, which must heed many other types of information. There are some grounds for concem however about the manner of his prioritization and conceptualization of freedom. The prioritization in Sen' s CA of capability over functionings can however be understood as a proposed policy principle rather than as a theory of well-being: a principle that we should leave people to decide for themselves about if and how to use a capability, whether or not their choices bring them well-being or goal fulfilment. First, there can be difficulties in specifying the meaning of 'attainable'; for example, attainable under what assumptions about ability to perceive opportunities, ability to formulate choices, ability to make choices, and ability to act ? These obscurities attach to the concept of freedom andare not specific to the capabilities formulation; and \vhile they sometimes become serious are not fondamenta! for our present purpose.
Second, education comes to have a special priority, like health, so that people not only have the opportunity to become educated but use it. Those various capabilities (in the substantive S-capability sense) to perceive, formulate, reflect, choose and act must be in place before a range-of-(valued-)choice conception of freedom makes sense.
Otherwise there is the danger that every expansion of the range of trivia or nonsense available for purchase, and every loss of moral inhibition, becomes automatically seen as an extension of human freedom and human development. Sen do es stress agency aspects of being, but arguably underplays the skills and personality formati on required for choice as opposed to bondage and, in Ananta Giri's terms, for self-nurturance, selfdevelopment, self-extension and self-transcendence, including for assuming responsibility and not only demanding freedom (Giri, 2000) .
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Sen certainly also puts value on negative freedom (e.g. Sen, 1985) .
Third, not merely is possession of substantive capabilities to formulate, choose and so on a prerequisite for the RO(V)C conception to have plausibility, and not guaranteed, it is in danger of being undermined by the RO(V)C conception. There are two levels of choice: a) the busy comparisons of the consumer in the emporium; and b) the level from which the busy consumer may be eternally diverted -including the choice not to busy oneself with trivia. This is part of an explanation of the Easterlin paradox, the lack of evidence that higher wealth produces sustained higher happiness or satisfaction. If some needs remain not recognised or fulfilled then we get the illusion of limitlessness of ( especially materia!) desires, as substitutes are sought endlessly and in vain.
A theory of capability not linked to a theory of need might be hollow and liable to mislead (cf. Hamilton, 1999; Walsh, 2000) .
The HDR 1998 starts from the principle that we 'must aim at extending and improving consumer choices too, but in ways that promote human life' (p. l ). So we require criteria for promotion that go beyond choice alone, in other words some conception of good human life. But its conceptual framework chapter tiptoes with extraordinary brevity past a few theories of consumption, then simply declares that 'This Report uses the understanding generated by all the perspectives to explore the impact of consumption on human lives from many angles' (p.40) and adopts the principle of consumer sovereignty without delimitation of its appropriate scope. HDR 1998 puts religions' warnings against materia! desires into a box, and skirts these too.
Desire is sometimes bondage. In South Africa, the current spreading of large casinos countrywide raises people's range of choices, formally speaking. New casinos are helpfully located within easy reach of the major population concentrations, the black townships, and subsidized bus services are provided. This is accompanied by a rise of compulsive gambling, with damage to families and many of the gamblers. 25 Thus some other conceptions of freedom concern contro! of desire and renunciation of illusion, through the understanding of causation, 'the recognition of necessity'. A conception of freedom could require a conception of reason.
Fourthly, even given the prerequisite substantive capabilities for choice, ranking situations according to the range of choice provided-so that e.g. the more sexual part 25 'A study by the Human Sciences Research Council, a think-tank, found that poor punters were losing more than they could afford, and that one gambler in seven borrowed to bet. HDRs themselves \Vith their de facto lists of basic needs/rights-have more to say. In fact SCA's distancing from felt utility, and its concern to provide other criteria for allocation or steering in public policy, make it less populist than its language sometimes suggests.
Fifthly, choice can be costly and a burden. Hypertrophy of options need not increase well-being, even if one has strong S-capabilities to skim, scan and select. Sen observes this on occasion (e.g. 1992, pp. 59, 63), and could reply that the ways of life in the attainable set are inclusive of the choices they involve and the associated costs and stresses. The point remains that adding more choices can be undesirable, when either A. it ties one up in excess choice processes, or B. more radically, it distracts one and distorts one's personality, not just diverts an unchanged personality. Case A can be fomrnlated to fit a RO(V)C conception; case B might undermine it.
Sixthly, freedom as the ability to achieve more and more is insufficient if others' freedom is not considered. Sen is strongly oriented to this point but, remarks Giri, his versi on of CA does not help much here. Its picture of agents is too thin to characterize, explain or promote sympathy and commitment. A human development approach needs more.
ROLES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE CAPABILITY APPROACH
The capability approach helps to broaden economics beyond commodities and open it to more interdisciplinary cooperation (Gasper, 2000b ) ; it stimulates useful empirical work and policy initiatives. This combination of contributions is rare. One wishes then to be clear on how to upgrade or complement CA, reduce mishandling, and assist evolution on to an improved next generation or successor.
The first and greatest role of Sen's CA is in the battle against productionism and obsession with GNP, by opening doors for more types of informati on, and stressing that how people li ve (the category of functionings) is more important than what they eam or spend. It is not the only route to that destination, but has helped many more people to reach it. SCA is a great advance over mainstream economics welfare theory, let alone the GNP/GDP worship in some economie policymaking. To be operational, simplified versions are needed, and CA provides the basis for a workable alternative set of pro xi es and indicators which surpass those in mainstream economics. Like all approaches, it can become a frozen substitute for thought, a new liturgy. But it can also function as a fruitful set of prompts towards creative examination of issues and situations.
The second main role has been to stress via the category of [0-]capability the value of freedom, the right to make one's own choices, judicious or mistaken. Here GDP per capita re-enters in the HDI, as a (flawed) proxy for agency freedom. By prioritizing the capability category CA goes further, but this prioritization is to be understood as a policy principle rather than as a theory of well-being: a stance that we should leave people to decide for themselves, whether or not this brings them well-being. Even if everyone in their O\Vn !ife gave normative priority to the leve! of functionings, in the public arena a one-step back conception is often required. With Giri and van Staveren she reminds us that: 'it is not enough to call for more public investment in health and education, and. more incarne transfers to offset entitlement failure. It is necessary also to examine the nature of the social institutions through which persona! care is provided to those who cannot care for themselves .
... The key issue is how to synthesize individua! self-realization and concern for others.
How can we avoid the enlargement of individuai choices leading to selfishness and a decline in community values and responsibilities?' (Elson, 1997, pp. 66-7) .
CA has helped open up a territory for investigation, within which we see much 30 valuable work (see: Robeyns; Alkire, Comim & Qizilbash). \Ve need to distinguish versions, including: the simpler versions expressed in the HDRs, which yet sometimes also go beyond Sen; the version(s) Sen uses for many working purposes; his full system of thought, including much besides CA; Martha Nussbaum's alternative; and further work.
How much long-term advance these versions and the whole approach will allow must simply remain to be seen.
Ul Haq warned that 'stagnant ideas die quickly ... It is critical, therefore, that the intellectual evolution in the human development area be stimulated further.... [The] human development ideas ... should be debated, criticized, brutalized and evolved further in many directions ' (1998, p. 225) . Sen joins the call to keep HD a dynamic stream, as ul Haq did, 'not a stagnant pool' (Sen, 2000b, p. 23) . CA may require peri- forum and still a research programme, is the challenge ahead for human development theory.
